

## THE STRATEGY OF PHILIP IN 346 B.C.<sup>1</sup>

THE relatively plentiful sources for the year 346 pose several questions which have never been satisfactorily answered. Why did Philip insist on an alliance with Athens as a precondition of the peace? Did Demosthenes simply invent the promises of Philip which he claims Aeschines reported to the Athenian assembly in Skirophorion? Why were the Athenians frightened when Philip got control of Thermopylae? They had long expected him to settle the Sacred War, and such action surely required occupation of the pass. The correct answer to these questions indicates that Philip had two alternative plans in 346. 'Plan A' was with the aid of the Athenians to turn on Thebes. By this move, he would reduce the power of the second greatest city in Greece and thus eliminate the possibility of a combination of Athens and Thebes, which might be sufficiently powerful to block his ambitions. If 'Plan A' failed, because of lack of Athenian co-operation, 'Plan B' would be adopted. 'Plan B' was to satisfy his existing allies, especially Thebes, by landing hard on the Phocians. Philip could not lose by either plan. In any event, he would secure control of the pass of Thermopylae which would give him access to central and southern Greece. He, of course, preferred 'Plan A', because it would give him greater control of Greece. With Sparta isolated by his support of her enemies in Peloponnese and Thebes weakened by division into villages and by liberation of the Boeotian towns, Athens would stand alone. The Athenians being unable to oppose his ambitions would be much more likely to co-operate with him in the realization of his ultimate aims.

### I. THE PROMISES AND THE ALLIANCE

According to Demosthenes in his prosecution of Aeschines in 343, the defendant had reported to the assembly of 16 Skirophorion 347/6 (about July 346, Dem. 19. 58) that Philip within a few days would lay siege to Thebes, repopulate Thespieae and Plataea, exact reparations for the sacrilege to the shrine, not from the Phocians but from the Thebans, and that he would give the Athenians Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis and restore Oropus to the Athenians (Dem. 19. 19–23, 35, 39, 42, 53, 63, 74, 106, 112, 220, 325–7). In his speech of defence at the trial Aeschines denied that he had ever reported any promises of Philip to the Athenians. He states that he reported only that he demanded of Philip that Thebes should be Boeotian and not Boeotia Theban, but had not promised it. Moreover, he had not reported that Euboea would be handed over to Athens, but only that Cleochares of Chalcis expressed his fear of the secret agreement between Athens and Macedonia (Aesch. 2. 119–20). This defence is totally unacceptable. Demosthenes in his speech *On the Peace* which was delivered within only two months from the time of the report of the Second Embassy refers specifically to these promises (Dem. 5. 10): '... there were some who assured us that Thespieae and Plataea would be rebuilt, that Philip, if he gained the mastery, would protect the Phocians and break up Thebes into villages, that Oropus would be yours and you would receive

<sup>1</sup> I wish to thank Mr. G. E. M. de Ste Croix for his frequent encouragement and helpful criticisms which were of great assistance in the preparation of this article.

Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis.' Surely, Demosthenes could not be misrepresenting what his audience had heard only two months before. Shortly after Demosthenes' speech *On the Peace*, Aeschines himself in his speech against Timarchus refers to his own warm feelings towards Philip because of the *εὐφημία* of his words and states (1. 169): 'If in what he does towards us in the future he shall fulfil the promise of what he now says, he will make praise of him a safe and easy thing.' Aeschines' optimism about the eventual results of the peace as late as the autumn of 346 is confirmed by his boast that it was brought about through Philocrates and himself (1. 174), while by contrast, in 343 when the peace was thoroughly discredited and Philocrates had gone into exile to avoid the death penalty (Hyper. 4. 29-30; Dem. 19. 116-18; cf. 112-113, 114, 119, 145, 206-8; Arist. *Rhet.* 1380<sup>b</sup>8; Aesch. 2. 6; 3. 79, 81), Aeschines prefers to speak of a partnership between Philocrates and Demosthenes (2. 13-14, 18, 20; cf. 3. 62-4). Just as Aeschines in 343 at his trial wants to deny any association between himself and the discredited Philocrates, so also he must have desired to escape responsibility for the promises of Philip which he had reported, obviously because in fact none of them had been fulfilled. He says even at that time that he had done his best to negotiate the matter of the independence of the Boeotian cities but that 'fortune and Philip were the masters of the issues' and it 'was not according to our prayer' (Aesch. 2. 118). The evidence, therefore, suggests that Aeschines not only reported the promises of Philip to the assembly but also that he believed them to have been made in good faith.<sup>1</sup> Was the Athenian orator deceived in his belief in the sincerity of the Macedonian king?

Philip would not accept the peace without an alliance. The First Embassy was actually established by a decree of Philocrates which he carried in the assembly which received the report of the actor Aristodemus of his embassy to Philip, for which Demosthenes had proposed him a crown. In this report, made both before the Council and the Assembly, Aristodemus had said that Philip wished to become an ally of the Athenians (Aesch. 2. 16-18). Moreover, the First Embassy brought to the Athenians a letter from Philip, in which the Macedonian king wrote: 'I would write more explicitly of the benefits I intend to confer on you, if I were certain that the alliance will be made . . .' (Dem. 19.

<sup>1</sup> No historian seems to doubt that Aeschines reported certain promises of Philip to the assembly, but there is much disagreement, (a) whether Aeschines himself believed in the promises which he reported and (b) if he did have faith in them, whether he was deceived. Arnold Schaefer (*Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 2nd rev. ed. Leipzig, ii. 268-74) gives Demosthenes' version that the promises were intended to deceive the Athenians. Gustave Glotz and Robert Cohen (*Histoire Grecque*, Paris, 1936, iii. 290-5), Paul Cloché (*La Politique étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338 av. J.-Chr.*, Paris, 1934, pp. 233-4), and A. W. Pickard-Cambridge (*Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom*, New York, 1914, pp. 274 and 278-82) argue that Aeschines was sincere but had been deceived by Philip. G. L. Cawkwell ('Aeschines and the Ruin of Phocis in 346', *R.E.G.* lxxv (1962), 453-9 on

p. 457) does not doubt Aeschines' laudable motives but does not commit himself to an answer to the question whether Aeschines was deceived; he writes that Aeschines offered the promises to the assembly of 16 Skirophorion as 'consolation and hope when nothing else was possible . . .'. Karl Julius Beloch (*Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd rev. ed., Berlin, 1922, iii. 1. 506-11 on p. 507), Fritz R. Wüst (*Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren 346 bis 338*, Munich, 1938, pp. 5-6 and 10-11), and J. B. Bury (*A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great*, 3rd ed., rev. by Meiggs, London, 1955, pp. 708-12) argue that Philip was serious about the offers which he made to the Athenians and that Aeschines was not deceived. The view to be argued in this article most closely resembles that proposed by Bury.

40; cf. 316; Aesch. 2. 45, 50), and this letter later mentioned by Hegesippus was still to be seen in the Council House at Athens in 342 (Ps.-Dem. 7. 33). Next, Aeschines at the time of his trial, and later, attempts to blame Demosthenes for prescribing 'the subject of an alliance' in addition to the peace in the decree which he proposed for setting aside the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion for assemblies to receive the ambassadors from Philip and to debate and vote on the proposals brought back by the First Embassy (Aesch. 2. 61, 123; 3. 68). Demosthenes, however, when he framed the resolution to be presented to the Council, could not avoid following the terms which the First Embassy had agreed with Philip, and the Council naturally carried this resolution for debate before the Assembly. Aeschines alleges in 330 (3. 71-2) that on the 19th of Elaphebolion Demosthenes stated that 'he could not conceive of peace without alliance', and that 'we ought not to break off the alliance from the peace nor should we abide the hesitation of the other Hellenes but must either make peace alone or make war alone'. Demosthenes, according to Aeschines, then summoned and questioned Antipater, one of the ambassadors from Philip, in order to confirm his statements. Antipater doubtless testified that Philip would not accept the peace without an alliance. These passages suggest not only that Philip attached great importance to this alliance but that the proposal was attractive to the Athenians. They also show that Demosthenes, from the earliest negotiations until the Athenian acceptance on the 19th of Elaphebolion, supported both the peace and the alliance. Philip was unwilling to grant the Athenians peace without an alliance, and therefore Demosthenes was forced to support the alliance in order to obtain the peace.<sup>1</sup> The difficulty which the Athenian orator experienced in countering the strategy of the Macedonian king will be comprehended only when an attempt has been made to answer two questions: What advantages did the alliance with Philip offer the Athenians, and what were they required to do as their part of the bargain?

## II. BACKGROUND

Before any answer can be given to these questions, the alliances and relations by which Athens and Philip were bound at the beginning of negotiations on the peace must be described. Athens, in addition to the members of her 'Second Confederacy', was allied with Phocis, Sparta, Halus in Thessaly (which was besieged by Parmenio), and Cersobleptes, king of Eastern Thrace.<sup>2</sup> The Phocians had possession of the Boeotian towns of Orchomenus, Coroneia, and Corsiae (Diod. 16. 58. 1), and the forts of Alponus, Thronium, and Nicaea, controlling the Pass of Thermopylae (Aesch. 2. 132). Philip was allied with Thebes, who now controlled the Boeotian League, with most of the Thessalian cities, including Pharsalus, Pherae, and Pagasae, and with Byzantium, Perinthus, and Amadocus, king of Western Thrace (see schol. Aesch. 2. 81). He was

<sup>1</sup> Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.* [above, p. 254 n. 1], pp. 251-2, points out 'that anyone who desired the Peace must give way on the question of the alliance'. That Demosthenes' sole motive for supporting the peace was to allow Athens the time to prepare herself for a decisive struggle with Philip has been received opinion, and rightly so, since the time of Schaefer, *op. cit.* [above,

p. 254 n. 1], ii. 176.

<sup>2</sup> Cersobleptes was a friend and ally of the Athenians, though not a member of the synod of the Athenian naval league, Aesch. 2. 9; 3. 61. His representative Critobulus of Lampsacus tried to have him enrolled on 25 Elaphebolion so that he could share in the peace, but this attempt failed, Aesch. 2. 82-6; cf. 3. 73-5.

supporting the Thebans and the Thessalians, who had a hereditary enmity with the Phocians (see e.g. Dem. 1. 22, with schol., and H. D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.*, (London, 1935), pp. 160–216), against Phocis in the Sacred War. In the Peloponnese, Philip had friendly relations with the enemies of Sparta: Messenia, Arcadia, and Argos.

In order to understand the relations between the Athenians and Phocians during the peace negotiations, one must keep in mind two related incidents which occurred in late 347 and at the beginning of 346. During the summer of 347 Phalaecus, the Phocian tyrant, was deposed from his rule, and in his place were chosen three commanders—Deinocrates, Callias, and Sophanes (Diod. 16. 56. 3). In about January 346 these leaders, in fear of Philip's intervention on behalf of the Thessalians and Thebans in the Sacred War, offered to hand over to Athenian and Spartan hoplites the forts Alponus, Thronium, and Nicaea, which controlled access to Thermopylae. The Athenians responded by ordering out Proxenus with fifty ships and a large citizen force (Aesch. 2. 132–3), and the Spartans sent a thousand hoplites in command of whom they placed their king Archidamus (Diod. 16. 59. 1). In the meantime, Phalaecus seems to have regained control of Phocian policy. He is credited with the repudiation of the Phocian offers both to Athens and to Sparta, and the fact that the Phocian ambassadors who had delivered these terms were arrested suggests that they were spokesmen for the former leaders (Aesch. 2. 132–5). In early February 346, at an assembly in which the peace with Philip was being discussed, the letter from Proxenus was read which reported that the Phocians had refused to hand over the forts.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the Athenians, although they were allied with the Phocians and retained feelings of friendship towards them, became extremely hostile towards Phalaecus and his supporters who during the peace negotiations were in control of the government of Phocis. Philip made skilful use of Athenian antipathy towards the Phocian leaders in his strategy of 346 B.C.

### III. PHILIP'S STRATEGY AND THE POLICY OF DEMOSTHENES

Philip hoped by the execution of 'Plan A' to gain greater control over the Greek cities by reducing Thebes to a minor power. But he could not accomplish this aim without an alliance with the Athenians, since he would need the Athenian army to help overcome the Thebans (see Aesch. 2. 137). An important part of 'Plan A' was to limit punishment for *ἑποουλία* to Phalaecus and his supporters and to let off the main body of the Phocians. Philip had two reasons for making this offer. First, he hoped to insure the co-operation of the Athenians who would have been eager both to punish Phalaecus and his faction for repudiating the Phocian offer to entrust control of Thermopylae to themselves and the Spartans and to protect the Phocian people who were their allies. Second, he expected by the immediate prospect of such a settlement of the Sacred War to provoke the Thebans into attacking him and the Athenians, and thus the Thebans, rather than himself, would incur the burden of breaking the alliance. He knew that the Thebans expected to recover their losses incurred in the ten-year war at the

<sup>1</sup> In Aesch. 2. 132–4, the Mysteries must be the Lesser Mysteries, for which there was a truce for 55 days, Gamelion 15 through Anthesterion to Elaphebolion 10 (roughly

January to March): see *I.G.* i<sup>2</sup>. 6. 76–87. I intend to treat this chronological problem in detail in a forthcoming book.

expense of the Phocian people and would oppose any settlement of the war which denied them this prospect. Philip was also likely to require the aid of the Athenian army against Phalaecus and his mercenaries since they had control of the forts and would be likely to resist strongly any settlement that involved their punishment. The Athenians could aid Philip by attacking them in the rear.

It was, moreover, essential for the success of 'Plan A' that Philip keep his Theban allies and the Phocian leaders uncertain about his intentions until his army was in a position at Thermopylae to be supported by the Athenians. He could afford neither to allow his own ambassadors to report the promises to the Athenians nor could he write them in his letters. In either of these cases, the Thebans and the Phocian leaders would have been forewarned and could have taken steps to oppose him. He had also to keep his options open in the event that the Athenians failed to support him at the critical time. In those circumstances, 'Plan B' would be put into operation. An agreement would be made to let off Phalaecus and his mercenaries, Thebes would be strengthened by the return of the Boeotian towns held by the Phocians, and the latter would be forced to pay severe reparations for the war. The evidence for Philip's strategy is, for the most part, found in the activities of the Second Embassy at Pella and in the events which followed the return of these ambassadors to Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Philip received the Second Embassy from Athens in Pella after returning from his Thracian campaign in about the middle of June, 346. Other embassies had assembled there from the Thebans, the Phocians, and the Lacedaemonians, and all alike were possessed by an agony of uncertainty about how precisely Philip intended to settle the Sacred War.<sup>2</sup> They must have known that it was *on*

<sup>1</sup> There are numerous problems about the First Embassy with which I will deal in a forthcoming book, but none of them is very relevant to Philip's strategy in 346, which is the subject of this paper. Only a few matters require comment in this note. Philip sent back a letter with the First Embassy (see above, pp. 254-5) in which he spoke vaguely of certain 'great benefits' he would confer on Athens if she entered into an alliance with him, but none of the sources attest that the specific benefits and conditions of the alliance were made clear to the Athenians by the First Embassy. In the assemblies of 18 and 19 Elaphebolion the Athenians most objected to the clause excluding the Phocians, Cersobleptes, and Halus, and the exclusions were eventually not made express: the final decision merely provided for 'the Athenians and their allies' to make peace and alliance with Philip and his allies (Dem. 19. 159, 174; Aesch. 2. 82), leaving the question who precisely Athens' allies were to be decided at the assembly of 25 Elaphebolion at which the oaths were sworn. Philip had made it clear to the First Embassy that he was determined to complete his conquest of the kingdom of Cersobleptes in eastern Thrace and that Parmenion would continue the siege of Halus in support of his ally Phar-

salus. In respect to the Phocian allies of Athens, as will be shown below, it was important that Philip keep his options open until he had reached Thermopylae; they could, therefore, not be included in the treaty at this time. G. L. Cawkwell in an article entitled 'Aeschines and the Peace of Philocrates' in *R.E.G.* lxxiii (1960), 416-38 has confused the embassies sent out under the decree of Eubulus in early 347 with a decree passed in early 346, with the result that he has given a false picture of the choice of policies with which the Athenians were faced in the assemblies of 18 and 19 Elaphebolion. I expect to consider his theory later in detail but must now be content to point out that if the embassies which went out under the decree of Eubulus and those which were sent out in early 346 were the same, then Demosthenes could easily have met Aeschines' challenge (2. 59) by simply naming Aeschines, since Aeschines participated in the embassies under the decree of Eubulus (Dem. 19. 303-4; cf. 10-1; Aesch. 2. 79).

<sup>2</sup> For the various embassies from the Greek states at Pella in June 346 see Aesch. 2. 112; cf. 103, 136; Justin 8. 4; on the Phocian ambassadors, also Dem. 9. 11 and Hypoth. 2 on Dem. 19 p. 337, 5-6.

*Philip's insistence* that the Athenian assembly two months earlier had concluded an alliance with Macedonia and her allies, yet Athens had not yet repudiated her alliance with either Phocis or Sparta, towards whom Philip was hostile. The position of the Lacedaemonians was especially dangerous if they were to be deprived of their sole powerful allies, the Athenians. The most complete account of it is contained in Isocrates' *Philippus*, the composition of which was being completed at the very time the ambassadors were in Pella.<sup>1</sup> He writes (5. 49–50): '... they (the Lacedaemonians) are being fought by the inhabitants of all the territory which surrounds their own country, they are distrusted by all the Peloponnesians, they are hated by the majority of the Greeks, they are distressed and robbed day and night by their own slaves ... But the greatest of their misfortunes is that they live in continual fear that the Thebans will settle their differences with the Phocians and march against them again ...' Isocrates also writes (5. 73–5) that Philip's enemies in Athens have persuaded many people that the Macedonian king intends by getting control of Peloponnesus to dominate all of Greece: '(they say) ... that, while you are giving it out that you intend to go to the rescue of the Messenians, if you can settle the Phocian question, you really intend to subdue the Peloponnesus to your rule. The Thessalians, they say, and the Thebans, and all those who belong to the Amphictyony, stand ready to follow your lead; while the Argives, the Messenians, the Megalopolitans, and many of the others are prepared to join forces with you and wipe out the Lacedaemonians; and if you do this you will easily be master of the rest of Hellas.'<sup>2</sup> Philip had cleverly let it be known in the Peloponnese that he would back the other states against Sparta. As early as the spring of 347 the strength of pro-Macedonian sentiment in Arcadia is demonstrated by the failure of Aeschines at Megalopolis in his debate with Hieronymus before the 'Ten Thousand', and the general failure of the decree of Eubulus to arouse any support for Athens against Philip in the Peloponnese showed similar feeling in Argos and Messenia (Dem. 19. 10–1, 303–6, 310; Aesch. 2. 79, 164). The Macedonian continued in this policy after the Peace of Philocrates had been concluded (Dem. 19. 260–2; 6. 9, 13, 15, 19–27; 18. 64, 295; cf. 5. 18). Since Athens had sworn an alliance with Philip, the Lacedaemonians were faced with the possibility of complete isolation. Their embassy at Pella (see Aesch. 2. 104) must have hoped above all to prevent any settlement of the Sacred War which might allow a strengthened Thebes to intervene again in Peloponnese or encourage Philip to lead an anti-Spartan campaign there.

The Athenian ambassadors disagreed about what policy they should adopt among these vital and conflicting possibilities, and they held a private meeting in order to try to formulate some unanimous decision (Aesch. 2. 101–7). Their decree of instructions provided that they should receive the oaths from Mace-

<sup>1</sup> For the precise date of the *Philippus* see Georges Mathieu, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrate* (Paris, 1925), pp. 155–6.

<sup>2</sup> Modern historians strangely ignore these passages of Isocrates in their accounts of the proceedings at Pella. See Schaefer, *op. cit.* [above, p. 254 n. 1], ii. 251 n. 1, where, among all the other sources cited for the embassies gathered at Pella, he includes the reference to Isocrates, *Phil.* 74, pp. 96 f. with the comment: 'According to him, one

should presume that embassies from Argos, Messene, Megalopolis were present' (my translation). Note that in the text (see p. 251) Schaefer does not include the information supplied by Isocrates but writes as if no embassies were present from the above-mentioned cities. Among modern accounts, only Wüst, *op. cit.* [above, p. 254 n. 1], 5, cites and employs Isocrates 5. 74 and he ignores the relevance of 49–50.

donia and her allies, negotiate the release of the Athenians who were held captive by Philip, and finally 'negotiate concerning any other good thing that may be within their power' (2. 103-4). Aeschines discounted the importance of the first two clauses but reminded his colleagues of what the Athenians had meant by the third clause. They, like Philip, understood the need for caution if 'Plan A' was to succeed. Aeschines said (2. 104-5): 'If now our people had thought it wise to speak out plainly to Philip, bidding him strip the Thebans of their insolence, and rebuild the walls of the Boeotian towns, they would have asked this of him in the decree. But as it is, by the obscurity of their language they left open a way of retreat for themselves, in case they should fail to persuade him, and they thought best to take the risk in our persons. Men, therefore, who are ambitious to serve the state must not assume the function of other ambassadors whom the Athenians could have sent instead of us, and at the same time, on their own initiative, try to avoid stirring up the hostility of the Thebans.' Demosthenes alone opposed the anti-Theban policy which Aeschines and the other ambassadors were advocating (Aesch. 2. 106) and urged that the embassy should limit itself to negotiating the release of the Athenian prisoners and the immediate administration of the oaths to Philip and his allies (Aesch. 2. 101-3). He had recognized the vital importance of friendship and alliance between Athens and Thebes in the struggle against Philip even before the fall of Olynthus. In the *Olynthiacs* he warns (1. 25-6, 3. 8) that if Olynthus falls only the Thebans will block Philip's line of march against Athens and thus great danger lies in Theban hostility towards the city. In the speech *On the Peace* (5. 14 f.), delivered within two months after this important meeting at Pella, Demosthenes states that if another war should arise with Philip the Thebans would not assist him. Such pro-Theban sentiments could not have been popular in Athens in the autumn of 346 when the Thebans appeared to have received so many advantages not enjoyed by the Athenians from the peace. Even in 343 the thought of an alliance between Athens and Thebes was still an anathema to the Athenian assembly which continued to envy the prosperity enjoyed by Thebes from the peace and to resent the non-fulfilment of Philip's promises to dissolve the power of Thebes. This is why Aeschines in his defence so often refers to Demosthenes as pro-Boeotian (Aesch. 2. 106, 141, 143). That this charge was perfectly true is proved by the fact that, in spite of the unpopularity of Thebes among the Athenian jurors at this time, Demosthenes includes with the other alleged disservices of Aeschines to Athens the charge that he had made Athenians more unpopular with the Thebans (Dem. 19. 85)!<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> The translation of Vince in the Loeb Classical Library of Dem. 19. 85 is inaccurate: 'Philip was resolved from the first to do for the Thebans all that he has done, but Aeschines by the perversions of his report revealed your repugnance, and so intensified both your hostility and Philip's friendliness towards the Thebans.' The Greek text reads: . . . οὗτος (Αἰσχίνης) ἀπαγγέλλας τάναντία καὶ φανεροὺς ἐπιδείξας ὑμᾶς οὐχὶ βουλομένους ὑμῖν μὲν τὴν ἔχθραν τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους μείζω Φιλίππῳ δὲ τὴν χάριν πεποιήκεν. The context suggests that this passage must be translated 'he has created hatred against you among the Thebans'. Athens was shown by her

acceptance of Aeschines' report to advocate Philip's destruction of Theban power. The display of such hostility would not increase Athens' hatred of Thebes but surely would only increase Theban hatred for Athens. An exactly parallel phrase in another speech of Demosthenes is accurately translated by Vince in the Loeb edition (18. 36): 'A further result was that Athens got all the ill will of the Thebans and Thessalians, and Philip all their gratitude for these transactions.' The Greek text reads: κατὰ πρὸς τοῦτοις τὴν μὲν ἀπέχθειαν τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους καὶ Θεσσαλοὺς τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι, τὴν δὲ χάριν τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πεπραγμένων Φιλίππῳ. Another parallel

pro-Theban policy of Demosthenes was irreconcilable with that of his colleagues, and the meeting concluded with the decision that each should say what he thought was in Athens' best interests during the negotiations with Philip (Aesch. 2. 107).<sup>1</sup>

Aeschines' speech before Philip was exceedingly anti-Theban (Aesch. 2. 113-17). His two main points were that it was wrong for Thebes to dominate Boeotia (2. 116, 119) and that punishment should fall, not on the Phocians as a whole, but only on the actual wrongdoers, Phalaecus and his associates (2. 117). In his later account of the speech, Aeschines stresses the lecture which he had given to Philip on the traditions of the Amphictyons. According to this summary, he read out the oaths which had been sworn by the men of ancient times that they would raze no city of the Amphictyonic states nor shut them off from flowing water either in war or peace and that if anyone should violate this oath they would march against such an one and raze his cities. He then solemnly declared that it should not be overlooked that cities in Boeotia were

passage is to be found in Aeschines' speech (2. 105): αὐτοὺς δὲ τὰς πρὸς Θηβαίους ἀπεχθείας φεύγειν. This can only be translated: '... they avoid stirring up hostility among the Thebans.' The schol. on Aesch. 2. 141 is another example: ὑπολειπομένης] εἰ μὴ πολεμήσαι Φωκέας, ὑπελείπετο ἔχθρα τῷ Φιλίππῳ πρὸς Θετταλοὺς καὶ Θηβαίους. This must be translated: 'If he had not fought the Phocians, enmity would have been left for Philip at the hands of Thessalians and Thebans.' These translations are supported by one of the meanings of πρὸς given by *L.S.J.*, s.v.n., C. with Accus., I, 6 (b), p. 1498, col. 1 'at the hands of'. Examples given are Thuc. 5. 105, Dem. 6. 3, and 18. 36 (cited above).

<sup>1</sup> Additional evidence of the pro-Theban policy which motivated those who were opposed to Aeschines and his supporters is to be found in Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchus*. A considerable proportion of the persons named by Aeschines as guilty of shameful homosexual relations can be identified on independent evidence as belonging to the pro-Theban group which included Eubulus, Demosthenes, and Aristophon among its leaders (that Eubulus and Aristophon were leading pro-Thebans before Demosthenes is attested by Dem. 18. 162 and Aesch. 3. 139). Leodamas of Acharnae is accused of homosexual relations with Hegesander (Aesch. 1. 69-70, 111; see also P.A. 9077) and later named as an avid pro-Theban in the days before the alliance with Thebes was concluded (Aesch. 3. 138-9). Pyrrhandrus of Anaphlystus is given as a defender of Timarchus (Aesch. 1. 81-5) and later listed among the pro-Thebans (Aesch. 3. 139). Demosthenes himself is accused of sexual relations with Timarchus and others (Aesch. 1. 130-1, 167, 181; cf. Dem. 19.

257). Other supporters singled out for vituperation in this speech were anti-Macedonian extremists. Hegesippus, son of Hegesias, of Sunium (Aesch. 1. 71), who in 343 advocated the most aggressive Athenian claims against Philip (Ps.-Dem. 7 *passim*), is connected with the destruction of the Phocians (schol. on Dem. 19 p. 363, 27 Df.; schol. on Aesch. 1. 71). Landing hard on Phocis was a corollary of the policy to favour Thebes, and thus Hegesippus is placed in the pro-Theban group; the man who originally proposed the Phocian alliance found it no longer expedient (Aesch. 3. 118). Hegesander, son of Hegesias, of Sunium, the brother of Hegesippus (Aesch. 1. 67, 69, 95, 110-11), is named as a supporter of Timarchus in the trial (Aesch. 1. 71). Diopieithes of Sunium, who as leader of cleruchs and strategos in the Chersonese from about 343/2 attacked Philip's allies and subjects in Thrace (Dem. 8. 6, 8; 9. 15; Ps.-Dem. 12. 16; Philoch. *F. Gr. H.* 328 F 158), is discredited by alleged involvement with Hegesander (Aesch. 1. 63). Finally, the reference to an individual among the strategoi (Aesch. 1. 132 ff.) who is expected to support Timarchus is probably to Chares, but space does not permit me to argue this point. Against all this evidence surely the argument of Cawkwell, 'Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. II', *C.Q.* n.s. xiii (1963), 200-13, on pp. 207-8, that 'Demosthenes' real aim all along was to involve Thebes in the Hellenic resistance to Macedon . . .' is a view supported only by 'very slight' evidence cannot be maintained. Brunt, 'Euboea in the Time of Philip II', *C.Q.* n.s. xix (1969), 245-65, on p. 253 n. 3, points out that Cawkwell 'gravely underrates the political significance of the *proxenia*'.



lying in ruin and that these cities were Amphictyonic and had been destroyed by Thebes (2. 114-6).

The Lacedaemonian, Phocian, and Athenian ambassadors, with the exception of Demosthenes, seem to have co-operated with each other at Pella as one would expect since they were allies of long standing (Aesch. 2. 136; Justin 8. 4). The Lacedaemonians and Athenians negotiated with Philip against the Thebans, who fell into great perplexity and alarm, and the Lacedaemonians came into open conflict with them and threatened them. Philip's 'companions' encouraged Aeschines and his associates to think that Philip was going to support the other Boeotian cities against Thebes (Aesch. 2. 136-7). It can be inferred from a statement in Demosthenes' *Third Philippic* (9. 11) that Philip promised the Phocians that he would punish only their leaders who were responsible for the sacrilege and would leave the civilian populations unharmed and their territory intact. Demosthenes states that on the march to Phocis both the Athenians and Phocians believed that Philip intended to treat the population of Phocis as allies. One need not accept Demosthenes' later interpretation of this situation that Philip was merely pretending at the time.

Demosthenes' policy in 346, accepting peace *and alliance* with Philip, had been forced on him by the absolute necessity for Athens to make peace, even on terms that might give Philip opportunities for further aggrandizement. If Athens refused Philip's terms, she was likely in the end to be left isolated and without effective allies. As Demosthenes showed, especially by his speech *On the Peace* (see, e.g., 5. 13, 24-5), he was a realist who would not shrink from pursuing a certain course of action, however disagreeable it might be to him, if (as in 346) there was no practicable alternative for Athens that would not in the long run bring her into subjection to Philip. Demosthenes took a calculated risk in supporting the alliance with the Macedonian king in order to obtain the peace. Acceptance of the alliance, in Demosthenes' opinion, would not be detrimental to Athenian interests, if he should succeed in frustrating its immediate intent which was to obtain Athenian help against Thebes (Philip's 'Plan A'). In the circumstances of 346, Demosthenes rightly saw that it was of primary importance to preserve Thebes as a potential ally against Philip in the final contest. The risk proved to have been worth taking. Demosthenes both got the peace which was needed to prepare Athens for the coming struggle and saved Thebes, while the alliance with Philip remained a dead letter after Skirophorion 347/6. The Athenian leader should not be blamed because the two cities combined were not strong enough to resist Philip in 338.

Demosthenes' policy required a number of sacrifices. First, the Phocians must be abandoned to the revenge of the Thessalians and Thebans in whose favour Philip had long been promising to settle the Sacred War. Second, it meant entrusting to the mercy of the Thebans the citizens of Orchomenus, Coroneia, Corsiae, and the other Boeotian towns who in order to obtain independence from Thebes had placed themselves under the protection of the Phocians who at that moment were holding these cities. Third, Athens' last major ally, Sparta, must be abandoned, if Thebes, freed from the distraction of the Sacred War, was to be left strong. Finally, Demosthenes' policy entailed the abandonment to Philip of control over the strategic pass of Thermopylae with not a vestige of Athenian participation in that control. All this was a large price to pay for the nebulous prospect of an alliance with Thebes in the all too uncertain future! There was no real assurance that Thebes would not remain

subservient to the many advantages of remaining in alliance with Philip. Demosthenes was willing to make these sacrifices because he could foresee that Athens' only chance of opposing Philip from a strong position was in an alliance with Thebes, and there can be no doubt that he was right. Whether it was worth while for Athens to oppose Philip at all is a different question which has been answered in ways more dependent on the political views of particular historians.

All the proceedings at Pella, and later at Pherae, moved against the policy of Demosthenes. Philip must have felt that 'Plan A' had exceedingly good chances of success. He did not require the aid of Thebes in settling the Sacred War, if the Athenians would act according to his terms under their new alliance with him. Moreover, the discredit that might befall him from turning against his ally Thebes would be more than compensated for by the more merciful and just solution of the Phocian problem that would then be possible; it was mainly Thebes which was hungering for revenge on Phocis. Furthermore, the policy of liberating the Boeotian cities from their Theban masters would gain him more popularity than it would lose him. The policy was always popular in Hellas except with the 'hegemon' who stood to lose by it, and Thebes was not really loved by any of the other Hellenic states. Moreover, this move would add to the image which Philip was attempting to create of himself as the protector of the weak states against the stronger—a position in which he had already been accepted by Argos, Messenia, and Megalopolis in Peloponnese. Above all, as both he and Demosthenes had long realized, by splitting the Boeotian hegemony of Thebes he would eliminate the last possibility of an effective alliance which Athens might some day make to prevent the further extension of Macedonian domination.

The Second Embassy returned to Athens on 13 Skirophorion (about July, 346) and reported to the Assembly on 16 Skirophorion (Dem. 19. 58). The Athenians were in a mood of fear and uncertainty at the beginning of the meeting because Philip had already been at Thermopylae for at least three days and none knew what move he would make (Dem. 19. 34–5, 58). Moreover, the dire warnings which Demosthenes had made before the Council had resulted in the absence of the usual congratulations and invitation to dinner in the resolution carried concerning the report of the Second Embassy.<sup>1</sup> These complaints and

<sup>1</sup> Cawkwell, *op. cit.* (above, p. 254 n. 1) on p. 453 cites Dem. 19. 58 as evidence that 'the second Athenian embassy returned from Macedon and reported to the Council on the 13th of Skirophorion'. This passage, however, dates only the arrival of the embassy, and the date of the Council meeting at which the embassy reported is not given by Demosthenes or any other source. Since 14 Skirophorion was the Bouphonia (see Deubner, *Att. Fest.* 158), the embassy would have made its report either on the 13th or the 15th, and there is no way to decide between these two dates. If, however, the testimony of Demosthenes is accepted that Aeschines remained with Philip for a day and a night at Pherae after the other ambassadors had left for Athens, he would have returned too late for a report to the Council on the 13th (19. 175; note that he makes a deposition

and summons witnesses). That the Bouleuterion was crowded perhaps also suggests the 15th. Secondly, Cawkwell argues (pp. 455–6) that 'on the 13th, when the chamber was thronged by the public (Dem. 19. 17), the Council was concerned with drafting a "probouleuma" proposing an expedition to save Phocis'. There is no evidence that any such resolution was ever drafted or considered. Demosthenes (19. 31–2) has the real resolution read out to the court in 343, surely in its entirety, since his main point is that it did not contain the usual congratulation of the Second Embassy. There is nothing here to suggest that the resolution contained a proposal for 'an expedition to save Phocis'. Demosthenes' other account of this meeting of the Council (19. 17–18) is studiously vague; he makes no explicit reference to the resolution at all, but only the

accusations had been heard by a large audience of private citizens, and their consequent discussion throughout the city would have been most disquieting (Dem. 19. 17-18, 31-2; cf. Aesch. 2. 121-4; Dem. 19. 234-6). The Athenians, therefore, on the 16th of Skirophorion very much desired reassurance. When Aeschines made his report of Philip's promises, the assembly accepted them with relief and pleasure, and when Demosthenes attempted to speak in opposition, he was shouted down (Dem. 19. 19-24, 35, 45-6; 6. 30).

Philocrates immediately took advantage of the favourable mood of the assembly by proposing and carrying a decree which provided that the peace and the alliance were to be the same for both Philip and his descendants, that Philip was to be commended for his promises to act with justice, and finally that, if the Phocians did not do what was required and surrender the sanctuary to the Amphictyons, the Athenians would come to aid against those who were preventing this surrender from taking place (Dem. 19. 47-50; see also 6. 31; 19. 54, 55-6, 87, 310). Demosthenes' interpretation of the third clause is unacceptable (19. 49-50), for by the clause 'those who were preventing this surrender from taking place' the Athenians were anticipating opposition by Phalaecus and his mercenaries. If, as Aeschines had proposed at Pella, the Phocian leaders were to be punished and the populace were to be left unharmed and in possession of their property, then obviously Phalaecus and his mercenaries could not be permitted to depart under amnesty. They would have to be taken by force of arms, and so by this clause the Athenians committed themselves to aid in the expulsion of the Phocian leaders.

As soon as Philocrates carried his decree, an election was held to select the

most oblique implication that he is speaking of it when he states: *καὶ ἔπεισα τὰυτα τὴν βουλὴν*. This claim is preceded by a very general and vague defence of himself that on that occasion he had advised that the Phocians and the Gates be not abandoned and that the Athenians should not trust to hopes and promises and allow matters to go too far. This apology is, of course, a lie, and nothing in the resolution drafted on the occasion would have supported it; otherwise, Demosthenes surely would have called for it to be read at this point. Indeed, the only argument Cawkwell himself tries to produce (457 n. 23) is that 'Dem. 19. 50 seems to quote it', and this is entirely without foundation: Demosthenes is merely giving some of the alternatives Philocrates might conceivably have adopted at the Assembly on 16 Skirophorion, and there is not the least reason to see here a reference to the resolution. Next, Cawkwell argues (p. 458) that there was 'another meeting of the Council after the 13th at which it was known that Philip was actually "en Pylais" and at which a new "probouleuma" was drafted on the motion of Philocrates...'. Cawkwell finds support for this second meeting in Aeschines' claim (2. 121 f.) that 'Demosthenes on his return from the second embassy... moved the vote of thanks in his decree...'. Cawkwell adds: 'Perhaps in the later meet-

ing of the Council the formalities omitted on the 13th were attended to, and there is no need to choose between Demosthenes' and Aeschines' accounts.' But if any such resolution gave thanks to the second embassy, Aeschines could have made a fool of Demosthenes by responding to his challenge (19. 32) to produce evidence that the ambassadors were congratulated. Aeschines (in 2. 121-3) was deliberately trying to confuse the reception of the Second Embassy with that of the First, which he had already described at great length (2. 45-54). On returning from the First Embassy, Demosthenes had moved congratulations: see Aesch. 2. 45-6, 53-4, where Aeschines produces the decree and testimony. When Aeschines said at the end of 2. 121: 'Demosthenes praised us in his *ψήφισμα*', he was clearly hoping that the dicasts, who a few minutes earlier had heard the real psephism proposed by Demosthenes on the return of the First Embassy, would confuse the two embassies and would be left with the impression that the members of the Second Embassy had also been congratulated by Demosthenes. Demosthenes (19. 234-6) warns the dicasts (or was this passage added after the trial but before publication?) that Aeschines will employ this very tactic.

Third Embassy to carry the decree immediately to Philip. Most of the same ambassadors who had served on the two previous embassies to Philip were re-elected, but Demosthenes declined to serve on oath (Dem. 19. 121–2, cf. 172). When the assembly had dispersed, the envoys met and discussed which of them would be left behind to watch and counteract Demosthenes. They did not fear, as Demosthenes asserts, that some resolution in favour of the Phocians might be adopted in their absence but that the pro-Thebans under the leadership of Demosthenes might trick the people into refusing to send the Athenian hoplites to Philip. The ambassadors, therefore, decided to leave Aeschines behind to prevent the Athenians from changing their policy (Dem. 19. 122–4). Although the Third Embassy to Philip was elected on the 16th of Skirophorion, its departure from Athens was delayed until the 21st of the month. How can this delay of five days be explained? It was almost certainly brought about by the efforts of Demosthenes and his supporters, who appear to have had much more influence in the Council than in the Assembly. It was necessary after their election in the Assembly to introduce ambassadors to the Council so that their departure might be ratified (schol. on Aesch. 2. 94). It looks as if Aeschines' opponents in the Council, just as they had a few days before prevented the congratulation of the Second Embassy, now obstructed the departure of the Third. Demosthenes later describes this five-day period: '... the whole business was still in mid-air and the future unclear, all kinds of meetings and discussions at that time were taking place in the agora' (Dem. 19. 122). All this confusion, Aeschines (2. 140) rightly says, was created by Demosthenes.

A letter from Philip now arrived (Aesch. 2. 137; Dem. 19. 51), asking the Athenians to march out in full force to aid him. The Thebans, fearing that the settlement of the war might be to their disadvantage (Aesch. 2. 136–7), had already marched out *πανδημεί* (Aesch. 2. 137). But Demosthenes and his supporters were now able to induce the Athenians to refuse Philip's request by persuading them that if they sent out their hoplites he would take them as hostages (Aesch. 2. 137). Perhaps Philip's one miscalculation was that he had not yet released the Athenian prisoners captured at Olynthus; during the negotiations at Pella he had said only that he would send them home in time for the Panathenaea (Dem. 19. 168). Demosthenes' efforts in 343 (19. 51) to discredit the importance and significance of the letters from Philip at this time must not be permitted to obscure the situation. To have admitted the sincerity of Philip in writing these letters would have undermined Demosthenes' case against Aeschines, and it was Demosthenes and his colleagues who used up the time for marching out, not Philip. Furthermore, Demosthenes is deliberately lying when he states that Aeschines and his supporters did not speak in support of these letters and recommend that the Athenians march out (19. 52). Demosthenes himself quotes Aeschines as making a statement a short time after this which presupposes that Aeschines had supported Philip in urging the Athenians to march out. A month later when the Athenians shouted down Aeschines for urging Philip's admission to the Amphictyonic Council, Demosthenes states that Aeschines exclaimed 'plenty of shouters, but very few fighters, when it comes to fighting!' (Dem. 19. 113.) Aeschines here could have been referring only to the wreckage of his plans when the Athenians had refused to send out their hoplites to support Philip in the Phocian settlement.

The refusal of Athens to send out her army caused great pressure to be exerted on Philip which is vividly described by Aeschines (2. 140–1, with the

schol. on 141). The Thebans, he states, were besieging Philip with their importunities while he was waiting for the arrival of the Athenians, and they had managed to deprive him of the support of the Thessalians because of the Athenian delay and their traditional hatred of the Phocians. Philip did not allow Phalaecus to depart under truce until the Athenians failed to respond to his second letter (Dem. 19. 51). In fact, he had not even received any official response in the form of the decree passed on the report of the Second Embassy due to the delay in the departure of the Third Embassy. Finally, faced with the open hostility of the Theban heavy infantry and the Thessalian cavalry who could have converged on him from north and south in a pincer movement, Philip was forced to come to terms with Phalaecus (Aesch. 2. 141; Dem. 6. 13–14) whereby the latter and his mercenaries could depart under truce on the 23rd of Skirophorion and Philip could take over the Phocian cities (date, Dem. 19. 59; terms, Dem. 19. 56, 61–2, 77, 324). ‘Plan A’ had failed, and Philip, because of lack of Athenian support, had been forced to execute ‘Plan B’. In the bilateral *agreement* concluded with Phalaecus, the Macedonian king reserved for himself all power to determine the character of the final settlement (Dem. 19. 62; Diod. 16. 59; cf. Dem. 19. 60; see also Dem. 6. 7).

News of the agreement reached the Third Embassy at Chalcis, and Dercylus returned to Athens and announced it, amid general consternation, at an assembly which was being held in Peiraeus on 27 Skirophorion (Dem. 19. 59–60, 125). All that happened, as Demosthenes says, was like a riddle to the city (19. 328). The Athenians decreed upon the motion of Callisthenes that the women and children should be brought into the city of Athens from all the country districts, that all movable property should be brought from the fields into the walls, the frontier fortresses of Attica should be placed in a state of readiness, and fortifications of the Peiraeus should be increased, and the festival of Heracles, which it was customary to celebrate outside the walls at Marathon early in Hekatombaion, must be held inside the city (Dem. 19. 86, with schol. p. 368, 6 Df.; 19. 125; 18. 36–7; Aesch. 2. 139, with schol.; 3. 80). The Athenians were extremely frightened—not, of course, by Philip’s having passed Thermopylae, an event which had been expected from the time when the king first assumed leadership in ending the Sacred War, but by the conclusion of an agreement between Philip and Phalaecus, clear evidence that the whole settlement which Philip would have preferred and which Aeschines, Philocrates, and their associates had promised was no longer possible.<sup>1</sup> Everything had gone wrong: the Phocians would now be crushed, and Thebes would benefit

<sup>1</sup> Misunderstanding by modern historians of the circumstances in which the agreement with Phalaecus was made has produced the most inadequate explanations of the decree of Callisthenes. The view of Wüst, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. 1], 14, who regards it as an ‘unsinnige Demonstration’, is rather typical. See also Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iii<sup>2</sup>. 1. 513; Schaefer, ii<sup>2</sup>. 293 and n. 3; Cloché, op. cit. [above, p. 254 n. 1], 236–7, and Pickard-Cambridge, *Dem.* [above, p. 254 n. 1], 285. The most adequate treatment may be found in the article by Rohrmoser, ‘Kritische Betrachtungen über den philokratischen Frieden’, *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen*

*Gymnasien*, xxv (1874), 789–815, on pp. 811–12. Note that in such passages as Dem. 19. 125 there is nothing about Philip’s passing Thermopylae; it is the ruin of the Phocians which is stressed; and this, rather than Philip’s coming εἰσω Πυλῶν is also what one should concentrate on in Aesch. 3. 80, where the unpleasant strengthening of Thebes is also stressed, as in Dem. 19. 60. Note Dem. 18. 32–6, esp. 32 (ἐντὸς . . . Πυλῶν) and the even more specific 35 (εἰσω Πυλῶν) from which it is clear that at the Assembly on 16 Skirophorion the Athenians knew Philip had already passed Thermopylae.

instead of being humbled. In the differing accounts of Demosthenes and Aeschines as to why the decree of Callisthenes was passed, each blames the other for the situation which resulted in the decree, and each account contains part of the truth. Demosthenes blames it on the reversal of expectations aroused by Philip's promises which, he claims, were deliberately reported by Aeschines and his supporters to mislead the people (19. 86-7). The reversal of expectations, as has been demonstrated above, certainly does account for the fear and uncertainty exhibited by the Athenians on the 27th of Skirophorion, but, in accepting this fact, one need not follow Demosthenes in judging Aeschines culpable for deliberately misleading the people. Aeschines himself testifies that the Athenians were disappointed in their expectations (2. 136), and his defence against Demosthenes' charge of misleading the people is sufficient (2. 118). The real responsibility for the situation, as Aeschines states, belongs to Demosthenes, who 'thanks to the combination of cowardice and envy' in him and 'to his *proxenia* with the Thebans' had prevented the Athenians from marching out to join Philip in the Amphictyonic settlement (2. 139 with schol., 141, cf. 3. 80).

If this account of Philip's strategy in 346 and of Demosthenes' success in frustrating 'Plan A' is accepted, then one of the main accusations against Aeschines at his trial in 343 was not only false but shameful. Demosthenes stressed again and again the charge that Aeschines caused the Athenians to remain at home instead of marching out to save the Phocians and Thermopylae by preventing the Athenians from learning the truth at the proper time; he, so Demosthenes argues, kept them from sending their hoplites by reporting the false promises of Philip (19. 20, 26, 34, 42-3, 49-54, 56-60, 72-7, 83-4, 178, 317-25). Aeschines, therefore, according to Demosthenes, was responsible for the destruction of the Phocians (19. 29-30, 56, 61, 63, 66, 78, 80-2; cf. Aesch. 2. 142-3; Dem. 19. 86, 99, 178-81, 248, 335; cf. Aesch. 2. 9, 81, 103-7, 114-18, 130-43, 153). First, neither Demosthenes nor Aeschines nor any other leader who wanted peace in 346 would have urged the Athenians to send their hoplites to prevent Philip from passing through Thermopylae and entering Phocian territory. Such a move not only would have ruined the peace but doubtless would have resulted in the defeat of the Athenian hoplites who would have been opposed both by Philip's army and by the Thebans and Thessalians who were hungering for revenge on the Phocians. As has been shown, the Phocians could have been saved *only* if the Athenians had sent their army to support Philip against the Thebans ('Plan A'), the precise policy advocated by Aeschines and opposed by Demosthenes. Thus, the prosecutor himself was guilty of the heinous crime with which he charges the defendant—destruction of the Phocians. Demosthenes can never quite bring himself to tell the lie that would have been recognized as such by all the jurors, that *he* had urged the Athenians to send out troops to prevent Philip from entering Thermopylae and Phocis; instead, he contents himself with vague falsehoods. He claimed that he had urged in 346 that the Athenians 'not abandon' the Phocians and Thermopylae to Philip (19. 18) and that Aeschines was left behind from the Third Embassy from fear that 'on hearing the truth from me (Demosthenes), you (the Athenians) might adopt some acceptable resolution in favour of the Phocians, and that so Philip might lose control' (19. 122-3).<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes had

<sup>1</sup> That Demosthenes' claim in 343 that he had urged the Athenians to prevent Philip from entering Thermopylae and seizing Pho-

cis in Skirophorion 346 was false is argued most convincingly by Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.* [above, p. 254 n. 1], 277-8.

Aeschines in a difficult situation in 343. The peace had become extremely unpopular, and none of the promises reported by the defendant had been fulfilled. Aeschines, thus, might be made the victim of the people's disappointment by his political enemies. Demosthenes' argument that Athenian hoplites could have blocked Philip's entry into the Gates and Phocis would have appealed to many of his fellow citizens who were discontented with the peace and were prepared to believe that their army might have stopped the Macedonians at the pass in 346 as it had done in 352; Demosthenes argued that this belief was valid (19. 83-4, 123, 318 f.). On the other hand, when Aeschines was responding to this accusation, it would have gone down badly with the jurors in 343 if he had stressed that the Athenians themselves had ruined the Phocians by refusing to fulfil their agreement with Philip to send out the hoplites to be used against Thebes. The Assembly usually preferred to blame its leaders for its mistakes rather than admit its own folly. Consequently, Aeschines cautiously limited blame for preventing the dispatch of the troops to Demosthenes. The majority of the Athenian jurors at Aeschines' trial discharged their duty in a most praiseworthy fashion by refusing to accept Demosthenes' false and malicious charge that Aeschines had destroyed the Phocians. Aeschines was rightly acquitted on the indictment for treason, and Demosthenes deserves condemnation for the means by which he chose to oppose a political opponent whose loyalty to the best interests of Athens, as he conceived those to be, must remain unquestioned. Aeschines, however, did not foresee that the destruction of the power of Thebes eventually would have placed Athens at the mercy of Philip. Instead, he naively trusted that Athens by co-operating with Philip would share in his success as an equal partner and, perhaps with his financial support, would regain her naval empire. This is merely plausible conjecture since Aeschines' policy was defeated at its inception by Demosthenes. The realistic leader, not trusting the good will of a foreign conqueror, relies on acquiring the power to enable his country to defend itself, if necessary, against such an aggressor. Such an one was Demosthenes.

#### IV. PHILIP'S ULTIMATE AIMS

Finally, what were Philip's plans for the future? His strategy in 346 B.C. furnishes a clear indication. Eduard Meyer ('Isokrates' zweiter Brief an Philipp und Demosthenes' zweite Philippika', *Sitzungsberichte d. Königl.-preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl.*, xxxi (1909), 758-79, at pp. 765-6) once argued that Philip was above all king of Macedonia, and his goals, very different from those of his son, were specifically Macedonian. 'Greece and especially Athens', according to Meyer, 'were not of essential importance to Philip . . . His policy's centre of gravity lay in the regions surrounding Macedonia: Thrace, Illyria with Epirus, Thessaly . . .' Meyer goes on to write that it was only when the policy of Demosthenes had forced him to bring all Hellas under his control that he turned to the idea of the invasion of Persia. This view is no longer tenable. By 346 Demosthenes had done nothing to compel Philip to seek control of the Greek cities south of Thessaly, but Philip's efforts to conclude an alliance with Athens began before the fall of Olynthus, and the immediate object of that alliance was the destruction of the power of Thebes. Such an aim is in no way compatible with the account of Philip's ambitions as given by Meyer. The possibility of an alliance between Athens and Thebes was a threat to his need to control Greece south of Thessaly.

Philip's ultimate aim to invade Persia and conquer at least the rich satrapies of Asia Minor meant that he must get control of the main Greek states, especially Athens, which, if left independent, might combine with the Persian fleet to cut him off at the Hellespont. Sparta could be neutralized by supporting the other Peloponnesian states, but he needed to destroy the power of Thebes before he could bring pressure to bear on Athens. So long as Thebes was friendly or neutral, Athens was not subject to attack by Macedonian forces, and the Thebans were not likely to submit to Philip unless he forced them (Dem. 18. 145-7; cf. Aesch. 3. 106). Of course, he did not want to have to fight Athens, and the chances were very good that, if he could force Thebes to submission first, he would not have to do so.

The answer to another question is indicative of Philip's long-range plans. Why did Philip not dissolve his alliance with Athens in the autumn of 346 since it had failed in accomplishing its goal? The great Athenian navy must have appeared necessary for Philip's designs against Persia. No successful invasion could be launched against the Ionian coast of Asia Minor with the Persian king in control of the sea unless the latter failed to make use of his sea power, a failure which a realist such as Philip would not take for granted. Memnon was later able to raise between three and four hundred ships against Alexander (Diod. 17. 29. 2 and 31. 3; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 18. 5), but fortunately for the latter in his invasion of Asia Minor in the spring of 334, the Persian fleet failed to arrive in time to prevent him from transporting his army across the Hellespont (Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*<sup>2</sup> iii. 1. 621-3). The Macedonians had no navy sufficient for Philip's ambitions, and thus Athenian naval power was an important component for the success of his plans. Though other problems occupied Philip during the years immediately following the peace and Demosthenes' speeches are mainly devoted to such issues, references are not lacking to Philip's ultimate need for the Athenian navy (see, e.g., Dem. 6. 12; 8. 44-5; also 6. 36; 19. 153). Of course, Philip needed the navy not only for the positive purpose of facilitating the invasion but also for the negative purpose of preventing the Phoenician navy from causing the revolt of the Greek islands in the Aegean during his absence, a plan successfully executed by Memnon against Alexander until the former's death (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 1-2; Diod. 17. 29).

Domination or control in Greece had very little to offer Philip. Most of the Greek cities were extremely poor, and hence Macedonia would derive few economic advantages from them. Thessaly was necessary for its cavalry but little else. Control of Greece south of Thessaly was of no use to Philip except to prevent those states from combining against him during his absence in Asia. The riches of Asia Minor and the large areas available for settlement there would offer great benefits to Macedon and perhaps tempt the Greek states to co-operate with her in securing them. In my opinion, Philip was sufficiently realistic and far-sighted to observe these advantages early in his reign and the glory which he sought, for example, in settling the Sacred War was not an end in itself but merely a means by which he hoped to gain increased support for his aims against Persia.